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Abstract 
 
In their paper Identity, Oppression, and Power: Feminism and Intersectionality Theory, Samuels and 
Ross-Sheriff present those who engage with intersectionality with three challenges: avoid essentializing 
any one expression of identity (race, sexual orientation, class) over another, acknowledge interconnected 
privileges as well as oppressions, and pay mind to the changes in context that shift the designation of 
social identity and status. These challenges serve as an unpacking of the more general definition and 
purpose of intersectionality that “proposes that gender cannot be used as a single analytic frame without 
also exploring how issues of race, migration status, history, and social class, in particular, come to bear 
on one’s experience as a woman.” In this paper, dissatisfaction with intersectionality is taken to be a 
symptom of an insufficient epistemological picture. I very briefly touch on the epistemological setting 
offered to us by Descartes and move on to examine that provided by Quine at somewhat greater length 
and show how neither offers us sufficient tools to interact with people in a manner that would satisfy the 
intersectionalist. I then present a metaphor that I suggest our epistemology would need to grow out of for 
us to sufficiently deal with intersectionality.  
 
 
 
 
In their paper Identity, Oppression, and Power: Feminism and Theory, Samuels and 
Ross-Sheriff present those who engage with intersectionality with three challenges: 
avoid essentializing any one expression of identity (race, sexual orientation, class) over 
another, acknowledge interconnected privileges as well as oppressions, and pay mind to 
the changes in context that shift the designation of social identity and status (Samuels 
and Ross-Sheriff, 6). These challenges serve as an unpacking of the more general 
definition and purpose of intersectionality which, “…proposes that gender cannot be 
used as a single analytic frame without also exploring how issues of race, migration 
status, history, and social class, in particular, come to bear on one’s experience as a 
woman,” (Samuels and Ross-Sheriff, 5).  
 
On the surface, there does not seem to be anything particularly controversial at work, 
however, critics have accused intersectionality of being nothing more than seductive 
pseudo-theory and of promoting discourse without disagreement (Carbin and 
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Edenheim, 15). In this paper, I will disagree with those critics and argue that 
intersectionality is a symptom of an insufficient epistemological picture. I very briefly 
touch on the epistemological setting offered to us by Descartes and move on to examine 
that provided by Quine at somewhat greater length, and show how neither offers us 
sufficient tools to interact with people in a manner that would satisfy the 
intersectionalist. I then present a metaphor that I think our epistemology would need to 
grow out of for us to sufficiently deal with intersectionality.  
 
The Cartesian story of knowledge as only that which we can know with the utmost 
certainty has pervaded western thought since the Meditations were initially published 
(Mignolo 451). While Descartes himself would not, perhaps, have been likely to 
endorse the majority of the things that have erupted in his wake, his method of doubt 
started the ball rolling nonetheless.  
 
The method of doubt requires one to reserve judgment on anything that she has not 
confirmed to be necessarily true through strict reasoning. Essentially, we come to 
genuine knowledge by thinking hard about an idea until we can see that it must be true. 
This method pits the empirically observable world against the rational individual, 
because our sense perceptions can so easily to fool us. It was thought that because at 
times one thinks she sees something, when in reality nothing is there, that perception 
could not, on principle, meet the high standards Descartes set for any genuine source of 
knowledge. The empirically observable world was, in a certain sense, now the enemy. 
Yes, Descartes did get the existence of an externally observable world established by 
the end of the meditations, but it was still the last link in his inferential chain. The 
sensuous presentation of that world with all pleasures it affords is simply a consequence 
of God’s goodness that we can regard with mild amusement, but never serious 
consideration, in our attempt to get real and worthwhile knowledge.  
 
In this story, knowledge is nothing like the intricately connected web presented by 
Quine. Instead, it looks something like a pyramid, so that at the apex is the most self-
contained idea, God. Our idea of God allows us to derive ideas about ourselves, our 
rational capacities, and the mathematical insights to which these give rise, until the 
bottom of the pyramid is what we often consider to be the biggest piece of our 
experiential lives – the physical world. Those things with which we interact on a daily 
basis, and which seem to make up the majority of our day-to-day activities in fact have 
the least significant impact on our knowledge of reality and our place within it. The 
Cartesian pyramid then, does not rest on its base but dangles from its apex. 
 
Contemporary feminism, with its concern for contexts that make up a person’s life, 
could not have functioned under an epistemology of this sort. Intersectionality is based 
on the notion that it is an inherently flawed perspective to imagine everyone as a slight 
variation of oneself. The Cartesian project never explicitly came to any sort of 
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resolution regarding other people but, the model of the person suggested by Descartes’s 
meditation on his own nature left one to assume that either one was surrounded by 
human bodies that are merely empty, or that those around one were doing the exact 
same sort of thinking and being that she was.  
 
On the surface, this reliance on analogy in considering the experiential lives of others 
seems to not be much of a problem. It is exactly what parents have been preaching for 
decades—put yourself in the other’s shoes. Unfortunately, reasoning from analogy does 
not train us to put on another’s shoes, but rather replace the original wearer with 
ourselves. This mentality is what leads some proponents of social change to falsely 
assume that “…underneath the superficial differences of skin color, genitalia, or 
behavior in the bedroom, Blacks, women, and gays and lesbians are really just like 
straight white men,” (Naomi and Schema, 147). 
 
Quine’s naturalized epistemology and the metaphor that comes in its wake promise to 
undo at least some of the damage done by the Cartesian project; rather than focus on 
the ways we could rationally connect ideas while remaining skeptical about our sensory 
perceptions, Quine rooted knowledge in our empirical observations of the world laid 
out clearly and evaluated methodically, but also subject to some degree of flux. Rather 
than treat the “bombardment of our surfaces” as something from which we should 
distance ourselves, as the Cartesians did, Quine saw “…an improved understanding of 
the chains of causation and implication…” connecting those bombardments with our 
scientific ventures as incredibly important to epistemology, (Leonardi and 
Santambrogio, 349).  
 
This account of knowledge lends itself to an image of a web. Our systems of belief 
form an intricate web where the outermost strands deal with the events of the physical 
world. When something occurs that seems incompatible with one or more of our 
beliefs, the system does not collapse, but rather waits for revision. We must look to see 
which beliefs both hold up and are supported by the incompatible observation, and 
make adjustments accordingly, going as deep into the web as we need in order to feel 
satisfied with our adjustment. This is different from the Cartesian method of doubt 
because while both focus on consideration of a belief in relation to the rest of the things 
we already know, for Quine “…our own direct observation…” is a pertinent point to 
consider, rather than the first point to be discredited (Quine and Ullian 13). More 
importantly, however, is the fact that even the center of Quine’s web is subject to 
change. The basis for our knowledge is not the immobility of God’s existence, but 
rather our commitment to the beliefs we already hold.  
 
Quine’s account of knowledge changes our landscape enough to provide 
contemporary feminism, with its prioritization of intersectionality to gain an 
epistemological foothold. In its most general sense, intersectionality is the notion that 
Res Cogitans (2014) 5                                                                                                                Siver | 5 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
no one aspect of a person’s identity can constitute her whole identity and that when 
dealing with issues of social justice we must avoid assuming it does. Commitment to 
this acknowledgement of contexts originally came out of African American women’s 
dissatisfaction with the early women’s movement because it seemed as though they 
must disregard certain experiences in order to fit in to the white woman’s struggle 
(Samuels and Ross-Sheriff, 5).  
 
The five Virtues of Plausibility found in Quine’s Web of Belief seem to provide the 
necessary tools for the intersectionality concerned feminist to go about her research 
thoroughly, while attending to the three challenges presented by Samuels and Ross-
Sheriff. I will demonstrate, however, that while those virtues do go some distance 
down the road in meeting these challenges, they still do not allow us to deal with 
difference in a way that fully eliminates the tendency to reduce the other person to an 
extension of ourselves.   
 
Quine’s first virtue, Conservatism, states that the fewer beliefs a hypothesis displaces, 
the more plausible it is, which speaks to the concern that if our beliefs are based on the 
ever changing physical environment, then belief systems will be in a state of constant 
flux (Quine and Ullian, 41). Rather than drop the laws of gravity when we see a balloon 
floating in the air, we accept that there are gasses less dense than oxygen. This is not to 
say that we should be avoiding radically new approaches to ordering our views of the 
world, but rather that we need to remain cognizant that the longer the leap the greater 
the chance of failure. It is in our best interest to move step by step rather than 
implementing something that sounds promising but has no empirical tethers to reality; 
“conservatism holds out the advantages of limited liability and a maximum of live 
options for the next move,” (Quine and Ullian, 41).  
 
Modesty, Quine’s second virtue of plausibility, is closely related to Conservatism as it 
states that the less surprising a hypothesis is, the more plausible it is (Quine and Ullian, 
41). Stated more simply, the more modest something is, the more likely it is to cohere 
with our prior observations. This requires us to acknowledge that the empirically 
observable world really is what it appears to be, and that there are no secret meanings 
we must decipher. Take Quine’s example of someone making a phone call and 
immediately hanging up; one assumes that the caller dialed the wrong number, not that 
the caller was a burglar determining if the house was empty. This assumption is made 
because misdialing is more common than breaking and entering, and therefore matches 
up more closely with our prior observations, (Quine and Ullian, 41).  
 
Conservatism and Modesty both speak to Samuels and Ross-Sheriff’s first challenge to 
“avoid essentializing any one expression of identity over another,” (Samuels and Ross-
Sheriff, 6). When we are in favor of vastly new conceptions of anything, it is often 
because we have decided that one aspect of it is key and, so long as that is done justice, 
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everything else can fall where it may. Neither Conservatism nor Modesty allow such 
behavior, and together they both prevent us from committing the same sins that 
feminism has historically committed, mainly, raising “female” to the throne as absolute 
without much concern for the rest of the pieces that make up a woman’s identity. 
 
Simplicity states that the hypothesis that covers the most ground in the briefest and 
most unified way is most plausible (Quine and Ullian, 43). It is too much for us to 
expect nature as a whole to bend to our demands of simplicity, but when presented with 
two equally reasonable options, we should follow the simplest. For example, Newton’s 
hypothesis of universal gravitation was not simple in the familiar sense of the word, but 
it covered with one account what had previously taken two unrelated accounts, (Quine 
and Ullian, 43).  
 
This third virtue at first seems contrary to the intersectionality concerned feminist’s 
project of bringing complexities to light, but it is actually key to Samuels and Ross-
Sheriff’s second challenge that we “…acknowledge interconnected privileges as 
well as oppressions,” (Samuels and Ross-Sheriff, 6). Similarly to what Quine sees 
as happening in physics we must, “…sacrifice simplicity of a part for greater 
simplicity of the whole when we see a way of doing so,” (Quine and Ullian, 42). 
Newton’s more complicated theory of gravity allowed physics as a whole to become 
simpler, so too would a more complex understanding of what constitutes a woman’s 
identity allow a theory of human experience to become simpler because it would be 
more encompassing.  
 
The fourth virtue of plausibility, Generality, has to do with the retention of evidence. 
We should not accept a new hypothesis that disregards all the evidence its predecessor 
found significant because, “the more general the hypothesis is by which we account for 
our present observation, the less of a coincidence it is that our present observations 
should fall under it,” (Quine and Ullian, 45). Rather, we should look for a hypothesis 
that manages to use the old evidence in conjunction with something else to create a 
more unified whole. When Einstein’s relativity overtook Newtonian physics, it did not 
throw the old theory away and start from scratch. Instead, it accounted for the things 
Newton could not, as well as those he could; Newton’s evidence became Einstein’s.  
 
Generality is crucial to Samuels and Ross-Sheriff’s third challenge that we “pay mind 
to the changes in context that shift the designation of social identity and context,” 
(Samuels and Ross-Sheriff, 6). The focus of this challenge is not on the fact that the 
contexts change, but that there is more than one context at work. Historically, the 
women’s movement paid no mind to the fact that a privilege for a white woman may in 
fact be oppression for a black woman, and we are called to recognize that this disparity 
exists. Generality does not require us to make blanket statements, but (given the 
presence of many contexts which need to be “covered”) requires us to keep an eye on 
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all those contexts as part of a single approach rather than keeping the contexts, 
important, but disparate features.  
 
Refutability, Quine’s fifth virtue, states that there must be some imagined event that 
could refute the hypothesis, and it is measured by “how dearly we cherish the previous 
beliefs that would have to be sacrificed to save the hypothesis,” (Quine and Ullian, 48). 
Samuels and Ross-Sheriff’s third challenge is benefited by not just Generality but 
Refutability as well. To “pay mind to the changes in context that shift the designation 
of social identity and status,” (Samuels and Ross-Sheriff, 6), we must recognize that it 
is not only possible, but most likely necessary that were we in a different place at a 
different time, our experience of someone’s identity would be different. Put more 
simply, we are required to acknowledge that a different setting could refute our 
hypothesis about who another person is.  
 
We have now seen how Quine’s web is a more promising metaphor than Descartes’s 
pyramid and that a case can perhaps be made that Quine’s Virtues of Plausibility might 
be used by the intersectionality concerned feminist to ground her project in rigorous 
methodology. What we have not seen, however, is anything that would discredit the 
critics who say that intersectionality is an empty term being used to “promote discourse 
with out disagreement” and that it is simply “seductive pseudo-theory” (Carbin and 
Edenheim, 15). However, it seems like there is something important in intersectionality 
trying to make itself heard, so rather than moving too quickly to discredit it, we may be 
better served by discrediting the ways in which we talk about it.   
 
If we are committed to intersectionality as having something more important to 
contribute to the public sphere than simply good research methods, this is presumably 
because it addresses issues of necessary interaction between people who have such 
drastically different experiences, that it seems impossible for either party to make any 
sense of the other. Quine might try to respond to such situations by saying that one or 
both parties needs to reevaluate their beliefs more deeply, until they can find a way to 
make what seem to be two incompatible systems collapse into one another. But, it is not 
clear his web metaphor allows him that way out, for the metaphor has built into it one 
of the most undesirable difficulties we have inherited from the Cartesian project. The 
problem with the web metaphor is that spiders do not make webs conjointly; no matter 
how intricate, any web is created by just one spider. 
 
By committing to the web metaphor, we seem to be committing to either one web with 
one spider we all constitute, or multiple overlapping webs, each with its own spider. If 
we allow one web with one spider, then we are back to assuming that the other person 
is necessarily using the same sorts of materials that we are to think the same way that 
we do.  This problem cannot be simply dissolved by allowing for multiple webs with 
multiple spiders, however. For, while we sometimes speculate that others are 
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participating in inaccessible modes of being, we are certain that they are when we 
conceptualize them as inhabiting webs that we cannot access.  
 
With this in mind, it becomes clear how Quine’s naturalized epistemology falls short of 
the epistemology that the intersectionality concerned feminist is advocating for. Carbin 
and Edenheim are quite right in saying that intersectionality is “one simple model in 
search of incomplete information,” (Carbin and Edenheim, 239) insofar as it is 
understood as a call to pay mind to the crossing of different strands in Quine’s web. 
The intersectionality concerned feminist’s main point is not that a person’s identity is 
made up of different pieces (segments of the web), but that within the other person 
there is something happening which I cannot analyze down, even in an attempt to fully 
understand it. Not because such an analysis cannot be done, but because it does no 
good. Our understanding of someone in terms of his or her “parts” (woman, student, 
white) does not give us a clearer or more accurate picture, and may in fact give us an 
inaccurate and incorrect one.  
 
I would like to suggest that what we need is not a web, but a garden of belief. Quine’s 
metaphor is insufficient insofar as it allows for only one sort of creating force per web, 
but its conception of beliefs as intimately and co-dependently connected is something 
worth preserving. A garden is made up of many different plants all inhabiting the same 
soil, under which their roots are closely intermingled. Observations which seem to 
contradict beliefs we already hold would be like a new seed being blown into the 
garden; that seed will either fail to take root (if we decide our initial belief is worth 
keeping) or will choke out another plant as it grows (if we decide our initial belief was 
flawed). Just as in Quine’s web, the roots of the plants become so intertwined and 
dependent on one another that we cannot consider any one belief (or plant) in isolation.  
 
The key distinction here, however, is that while a web requires a single spider for its 
creation, a garden could not be created from a single source. Apple trees and 
sunflowers inhabit the same space, both contributing to the overall structure of the 
garden equally, yet it is unnecessary (if not incoherent) to seek an explanation for how 
the two are really the same in either origin or purpose—they both have roots and are 
therefore equal participants in the garden of belief. Preoccupation with intersectionality, 
then, is not so much a project as it is a symptom of an insufficient theory. By 
recognizing a story of meaning with more than one source, the anguish involved in 
determining which sources should be analyzed out and which can be retained fade 
away, as there is no need to reduce one source into another.  
 
On the surface, intersectionality in feminist theory is a demand for a reworking of our 
understandings of identity, what this requires, however, is much more complex. Until 
all traces of the Cartesian project are removed from our epistemology, it does not 
appear to be possible to understand the other as anything but a reconstitution of myself. 
Res Cogitans (2014) 5                                                                                                                Siver | 9 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
Quine’s story of knowledge as a web of belief comes close, but its allocation of only 
one creator is still prey to the Cartesian mistake of turning the other into myself. By 
changing the web into a garden, however, we may come closer to fully removing the 
Cartesian inspiration and, in effect, come closer to an effective epistemology.  
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